UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21393
12 July 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HIS MISSION OF GOOD OFFICES IN CYPRUS

1. The present report on my mission of good offices concerning Cyprus is being submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 649 (1990) of 12 March 1990, which requested me to inform the Council of the progress made in resuming the intensive talks and in developing an agreed outline of an overall agreement in line with that resolution. In my report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus of 31 May 1990 (S/21340), I informed the Council that the consultations with the two sides on the implementation of resolution 649 (1990) had not been completed and that I would submit a further report when this had happened.

Recent developments

2. As I had informed the Council in my report of 8 March 1990 (S/21183), the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus had accepted my invitation to meet with me for an indefinite period of time, beginning on 26 February, and to make a determined effort to arrive at an agreed outline of an overall agreement.

3. The members of the Council will recall that, in my opening statement on 26 February, I set out the purpose for which the meeting had been called (see S/21183, paras. 4-8 and annex I). I underlined the necessity, when completing the outline of an overall agreement, to deal with all the issues that comprised the Cyprus problem. I noted that the initiative I had taken since August 1988 had clearly identified those issues. I again urged them to agree to the headings of the outline that had emerged during their talks. I recalled the ideas which had been discussed with them and which I had summarized during our meeting of 29 June 1989. I reiterated that those ideas should prove helpful in arriving at an agreed outline.

4. I further stated that the task of arriving at an agreed outline would be facilitated if both leaders agreed to reflect under the overall objectives of the agreement the following understandings:

> "Cyprus is the common home of the Greek Cypriot community and of the Turkish Cypriot community. Their relationship is not one of majority and minority, but one of two communities in the State of Cyprus. The mandate given to me by the Security Council makes it clear that my mission of good offices is with

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the two communities. My mandate is also explicit that the participation of the two communities in this process is on an equal footing. The solution that is being sought is thus one that must be decided upon by, and must be acceptable to, both communities. It must also respect the cultural, religious, social and linguistic identity of each community.

"The 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the two communities, as well as the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council, have set out the framework within which a solution must be found. The two communities and the Security Council have committed themselves to a solution that will ensure the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus. The two communities have, in the 1979 high-level agreement, specifically rejected as options union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession. The two communities have stated that they wish to establish a federation that is bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects."

5. As I informed the Council in my report of 8 March, my talks with the two leaders, which took place from 26 February to 2 March, did not achieve any progress owing to conceptual difficulties that emerged from the very outset of the meeting and which were reflected in the introduction of new terminology (see S/21183, para. 13).

6. In my statement on Friday 2 March (see S/21183, annex II), I recalled that:

"In drawing up its mandate for the Secretary-General's good offices in Cyprus, the Security Council thus posited a solution based on the existence of one State of Cyprus comprising two communities."

7. I also recalled that

"In line with the mandate entrusted to me by the Security Council and the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, the objective of the good offices is a new constitution for the State of Cyprus that will regulate the relations between the two communities in Cyprus in a federal, bi-communal and bi-zonal basis."

8. I told the two leaders that after reflecting on the developments of the previous days I had concluded that:

"Unless acceptable to both sides, any change in terminology could alter the conceptual framework to which all had thus far adhered. In the circumstances, I have come to the conclusion, regrettably, that we face an impasse of a substantive kind, which raises questions regarding the essence of the mandate of good offices given to me by the Security Council and, therefore, regarding the basis of the talks."

9. I told them that I would inform the Security Council of the situation and to seek its guidance on how to proceed.

10. After considering my report of 8 March, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 649 on 12 March 1990 in which it inter alia:

"Reaffirms in particular its resolution 367 (1975) as well as its support for the 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements between the leaders of the two communities in which they pledged themselves to establish a bi-communal Federal Republic of Cyprus that will safeguard its independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment, and exclude union in whole or in part with any other country and any form of partition or secession;

"Expresses its full support for the current effort of the Secretary-General in carrying out his mission of good offices concerning Cyprus;

"Calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely a mutually acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a federation that will be bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects in line with the present resolution and their 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, and to co-operate, on an equal footing, with the Secretary-General in completing, in the first instance and on an urgent basis, an outline of an overall agreement, as agreed in June 1989;

"Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his mission of good offices in order to achieve the earliest possible progress and, toward this end, to assist the two communities by making suggestions to facilitate the discussions;

"Calls on the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation."

11. The unanimous adoption of resolution 649 (1990) was an important development. In that resolution, the Council made it clear once again that my mission of good offices was addressed expressly to the two communities, which are the participants in the process to achieve, on an equal footing, an agreed solution to the Cyprus problem. The Council also made it clear that the specific solution to be worked out had to be a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation that would ensure the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus and would exclude union in part or in whole with any other country or any form of partition or secession.

12. As I informed the Council in my report of 31 May (S/21340), consultations were held in Nicosia with the two sides during May and June. Both leaders confirmed that they were committed to all aspects of resolution 649 (1990) and that they would co-operate fully with me in accordance with that resolution. They also affirmed their agreement with the understandings quoted in paragraph 4 above.

13. During these contacts, my views on the current situation were conveyed to both leaders. I stated that in the light of the 26 February-2 March meeting, I did not intend to convene another meeting with the two leaders until I was assured that it would yield concrete results. Towards this end, I proposed that separate

discussions take place in Nicosia. I also noted that resolution 649 (1990) and the report on which it was based (S/21183) contained numerous elements that should help to achieve the immediate objective foreseen in that resolution.

14. In resolution 649 (1990), the Council called on the two leaders "to co-operate, on an equal footing, with the Secretary-General in completing, in the first instance and on an urgent basis, an outline of an overall agreement, as agreed to in June 1989".

15. In this connection, it is relevant to recall that, at my 29 June 1989 meeting with the two leaders, I had summarized the ideas that could be included, as part of an integrated whole, in the outline and which had been explored with them. I expressed the view that those ideas offered a real possibility of bridging the positions of the two sides. I proposed that my colleagues continue their talks with them to complete the preparation of the outline. Finally, I invited them to meet with me again to consider the completed outline and to launch the negotiation of an overall agreement. Both leaders had pledged their co-operation in completing this task and accepted my invitation. As the Council is aware, it has not as yet been possible to progress beyond this point.

16. During the past seven months, the Security Council has pronounced itself on the Cyprus problem on four occasions. The President, on behalf of the members of the Council, has issued three statements (S/21026, S/21160 and S/21361) and, of course, the Council has adopted resolution 649 (1990). These documents clearly reflect the importance that the Council attaches to an early negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem, and that it shares my disappointment that it has not yet been possible to arrive at an agreed outline of an overall agreement. By affirming the parameters of the solution, they also reflect the desire of the Council to assist the two communities to achieve concrete results.

17. The three rounds of talks that were initiated by me in August 1988 have clearly brought out all the issues that need to be covered in an overall agreement and have produced ideas that should be helpful in arriving at an agreed outline. Despite these encouraging developments, as I have reported to the Council in my previous reports (S/21010 and S/21183), it has not yet been possible to achieve concrete results. This has led to considerable disappointment and to a general deterioration of the atmosphere.

18. As I told the two leaders on 26 February 1990, if we are to achieve our objective, both sides must be prepared to take into account each other's concerns and be willing to make a joint effort to find a way to harmonize their respective legitimate interests. This effort will fail if either side insists on limiting the scope to only those issues that it considers important. Solutions acceptable to both communities must be found for all issues. As I have repeatedly emphasized, this requires moderation and a willingness to compromise.

19. The adoption of resolution 649 (1990), which confirms the essential elements of the solution, and the acceptance by both sides of all aspects of that resolution as well as of the understandings quoted in paragraph 4 above, would suggest that both leaders can now proceed with the work agreed to in June 1989.

READEX FICHE

Plan of action

20. It is important that the two leaders meet with me as soon as possible to agree on an outline and to launch the negotiation of an overall agreement. However, after the disappointment of our last meeting, it should first be ensured that such a meeting will yield the intended results. I have therefore proposed that separate discussions take place in Nicosia to prepare the ground.

21. In these discussions, I will again submit to the two leaders the headings that had emerged from their talks as a basis for organizing the work of arriving at an agreed outline. In separate discussions, both sides will also be asked, in line with their agreements reported in paragraph 12 above, to indicate their positions on each of the headings and sub-headings with a view to completing an outline as had been agreed in June 1989. Further, in line with paragraph 4 of resolution 649 (1990), I intend to make suggestions, as necessary, to assist the two sides in arriving at an agreed outline. Once an agreed outline is within reach, I will invite the two leaders to meet with me personally to complete this task and to launch negotiations on an overall agreement.

22. As I have noted above, there has been a general deterioration of the atmosphere because of developments in recent months and there is an increasing sense of frustration, not least because of the present lack of progress. The support of all concerned is now necessary if we are to prevent the situation from worsening. The coming period will be of critical importance. Of course, first and foremost, the co-operation of the two communities is essential. In addition, I am sure that the guarantor Powers will wish to play a constructive role in creating the conditions that will facilitate achieving a solution.

23. It is important that resolution 649 (1990) be acted upon in all its aspects. Negotiations are unlikely to succeed without the promotion of a more understanding relationship between the two communities. At the same time, such a relationship cannot take root without a sincere commitment to meaningful negotiations.

24. The two communities must make a conscious effort to convey to each other, through their words and their deeds, a clear message that promotes mutual confidence. Both leaders must help this process by making comments and suggestions that are moderate and that are more amenable to serious negotiations. Special attention should also be given to promoting greater contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and to doing this in a manner that does not seek political advantage for either side.

25. The time has come to stop mutual recriminations and to concentrate efforts on promoting reconciliation. The time has come for all concerned to give proof that they truly want to contribute to a solution of the Cyprus problem.

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S/21394
13 July 1990
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Item 35 of the preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 12 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 6 June 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia and its annex containing a message dated 22 May 1990 from the President of Czechoslovakia to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (document A/45/308-S/21352) dated 11 June 1990.

In his message, the President of Czechoslovakia refers to statements by the President of the Republic of Iraq in a manner which distorts the facts. It seems that the President of Czechoslovakia had consulted only biased press reports which had distorted the remarks made by President Saddam Hussein.

The President of Czechoslovakia would have done better to refer to the official text of the statements by the President of the Republic of Iraq before drawing a hasty conclusion about them.

President Saddam Hussein has repeatedly stated that Iraq would strike Israel if the latter attacked Iraq or any Arab country. In view of the past record of Israeli aggression against Iraq and other Arab countries, the statements by President Saddam Hussein are designed to prevent Israel from pursuing its hostile schemes, which have always been the main, if not the sole, cause of the upheaval which threatens security, stability and peace in the region.

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* A/45/50.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 35 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly Security Council

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16 July 1990

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 29, 71 and 144 of the
preliminary list*
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
BETWEEN STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 13 July 1990 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to our letter dated 15 January 1990 (A/45/79-S/21080), I have the honour to report to you the following two incidents of violation of Pakistan territory from the Afghanistan side, which occured on 14 and 26 June 1990:

"On 14 June 1990, at 0200 hours, the Kabul régime forces fired one SCUD missile, which landed in the area of Teri Mangal in the Kurram Agency. As a result, one Afghan refugee was injured.

"On 26 June 1990, at 1615 hours, the Kabul régime forces fired one SCUD missile, which landed in the area of Peiwar Kotal in the Kurram Agency. As a result, four Afghan refugees were injured."

The Afghan Chargé d'affaires was summoned to the Foreign Office on the morning of 1 July 1990 and a strong protest was lodged with him, asking the Kabul régime to stop such attacks immediately.

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* A/45/50.

The Afghan Chargé d'affaires was also told about the rejection by the Government of Pakistan of the protests made by the Kabul régime, in which it was stated that on 6, 24 and 27 June 1990, Pakistani aircraft had violated Afghan territory. The allegations had been investigated and found to be baseless. The Kabul régime was advised to refrain from attempts to malign Pakistan by its propaganda campaign.

I request you to have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under items 29, 71 and 144 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Arif AYUB
Acting Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21396
16 July 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 JULY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF LEBANON TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that the Lebanese Government has decided to request the Security Council to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which expires on 31 July 1990, for a further period of six months, on the basis of the provisions of Security Council resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 501 (1982), 509 (1982) and of all other relevant resolutions and decisions of the Security Council.

The Lebanese Government, faced with Israel's continued occupation of parts of southern Lebanon for more than 12 years and its adamant refusal to withdraw its forces in order to allow UNIFIL to perform its mandate as set forth in Security Council resolution 425 (1978), appeals once again to the Security Council to take speedy action towards its implementation.

The Lebanese Government, at a time when it has patiently embarked on a policy of extending its authority over its national territory, is persuaded that the presence of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon remains presently of utmost necessity. However, its continued renewal should not be considered as an alternative to the fulfilment of its original mandate.

Israel, meanwhile, has continued its daily acts of aggression against the civilians of southern Lebanon, in violation of their basic human rights and in blatant disregard of the norms of international law. Furthermore, it has been engaged in the process of linking the economic and administrative infrastructure of southern Lebanon to its own. This creeping annexation should be stopped through the immediate implementation of Security Council resolution 425 (1978).

The Lebanese Government takes this opportunity to pay tribute to the UNIFIL command, troops and administrators and to the troop contributing countries for their efforts and sacrifices in serving the cause of peace. It also expresses its deep appreciation for the tireless endeavours of the Secretary-General and his aides, which are instrumental in the valuable presence and work of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/21397*
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Item 35 of the preliminary list**
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 17 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the Lebanese Government's programme for the implementation of the Charter of National Reconciliation, adopted earlier at Taif, which was published by the Council of Ministers on 11 July 1990.

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 35 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Khalil MAKKAWI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* Reissued for technical reasons.

** A/45/50.

ANNEX

Programme of the Lebanese Government for the implementation of the Charter of National Reconciliation

In view of developments in Lebanon and with the intention of ending the bloodshed, putting an end to the violence and facilitating the peace process, as well as in order to meet the aspirations of all Lebanese citizens, regardless of their religious or political affiliation, the Lebanese Government has adopted a programme for the implementation of the Charter of National Reconciliation, on the basis of the principles laid down in that Charter, with a view to finding a solution to the crisis, ensuring general reconciliation and promoting security and peace.

Legitimacy dictates that the prerequisites to be taken as a basis by all Lebanese parties in order to join in the process of reconciliation, security and peace and to participate in the current Government should be as follows:

(a) Explicit approval of all points set out in the Charter of National Reconciliation, and a commitment not to obstruct implementation of the Charter in any way and to respect any laws promulgated by the National Assembly and any decisions adopted by the Council of Ministers concerning the Charter, as well as any interpretation by the Council of the Charter - the Charter of National Reconciliation being regarded as the appropriate instrument for putting an end to the unrest and fighting, liberating Lebanese territory and reconstructing a strong, just and democratic State that exercises full sovereignty over the whole of Lebanon and both protects and supports national independence;

(b) Recognition of the legitimacy of constitutional bodies and acceptance of their authority;

(c) Turning to advantage both the propitious international situation and the Arab role in support of the peace process, and consideration of Lebanese-Syrian ties, the overall framework of which was defined by the Charter of National Reconciliation, as a corner-stone for the propagation of peace and the consolidation of reconciliation in Lebanon, necessitating the establishment of fraternal relations between all the Lebanese parties and Syria;

(d) Recognition of the settlement of national differences among all Lebanese parties as a fundamental prerequisite and important pillar of the national reconciliation process: in order for such differences to be settled, no group may claim that it alone represents a religious denomination or a particular geographical area and no group may call for the exclusion of any other group that approves the above-mentioned prerequisites.

With a view to implementing the Charter of National Reconciliation and putting an end to the state of disruption resulting from the situation in East Beirut and some other regions, the Lebanese Government:

1. Requests the Lebanese National Assembly to convene in a special session in order to adopt the proposed constitutional reforms submitted to it by the Government in accordance with the Charter of National Reconciliation;

2. Appeals to former army commander General Michel Aoun to accept the above-mentioned prerequisites and to support the peace process, reconciliation and the rule of law, and urges all officers and military personnel, wherever they may be, to accept forthwith the authority of army commander General Emile Lahoud, so as to fulfil their national duty by extending the autnority of the Lebanese State. Any officer, non-commissioned officer or conscript who does not respond to this appeal by the date to be set by army commander General Emile Lahoud shall be dismissed from the armed forces and stripped of his rights;

3. Calls on the warring parties in Iqlim al-Tuffah to put an end to their fighting forthwith and to withdraw from that sector and return it to the legitimate authorities;

4. Considers that the recent statement of position by the Lebanese Forces is a step that must be complemented by practical action on their part in such a way as to facilitate the extension of the authority of the State and the law to regions currently controlled by the Lebanese Forces, and calls for adoption of the following procedure:

(a) The Lebanese Forces shall unequivocally declare that they respect the above-mentioned prerequisites;

(b) The Lebanese Forces shall withdraw from Beirut so that army units, under the leadership of General Emile Lahoud, and the internal security forces may take control of the Achrafieh district and its environs, of the Port of Beirut and of the Dock No. 5, following which the administrative region of East and West Beirut shall be declared clear of all militias in preparation for the establishment of Greater Beirut;

(c) The Lebanese Forces shall hand over control of all the army barracks located at Beirut, Kesrouane and Jbail and return all war matériel (weapons, ammunition and equipment) to the legitimate army led by Emile Lahoud;

5. Emphasis is placed on the responsibility of the State to protect regions returned to its control, since the State alone is responsible for the security of the regions and of the population of those regions, and any attack on such regions shall be considered an attack on the State as a whole. The State reaffirms that it is fully and unreservedly entitled to assume such responsibility and to fulfil the obligations deriving therefrom, without being bound by any restriction or condition. Such responsibility shall extend to all regions where the military forces or militias that accept the above-mentioned procedure are assembled, including Kesrouane and Jbail;

6. The same treatment and criteria shall be extended to all militias, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of National Reconciliation;

7. As an extension of the spirit of the Charter of National Reconciliation, the Lebanese State shall, with the co-operation of the Tripartite High Arab Committee and the Syrian Government, work towards the settlement of national differences among all Lebanese parties;

8. The Lebanese Government reaffirms that it will continue to fulfil its responsibilities towards the south, in particular by liberating the occupied part of the country and implementing Security Council resolution 425 (1978), and calls upon the international community to support it in such efforts.

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18 July 1990

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fourth session
Agenda item 47
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 17 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit, enclosed herewith, a letter addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Özer Koray, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, in connection with the Greek Cypriot application for full membership of the European Community (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 47, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mustafa AKSIN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 17 July 1990 from Mr. Özer Koray to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to attach herewith a letter and its annex, a memorandum addressed by President Rauf R. Denktas to the President in Office of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities on 12 July 1990 in relation to the recent Greek Cypriot application for membership of the European Communities (see appendix).

This unilateral application creates a fundamentally altered situation and constitutes a negative development. It was made in spite of the views expressed by the Turkish Cypriot side and in violation of operative paragraph 5 of the United Nations Security Council resolution 649 (1990). It, therefore, constitutes a major impediment in the way of the negotiating process. This development is totally contrary to the letter and spirit of resolution 649 (1990) and cannot be expected to facilitate the good offices mission of the United Nations Secretary-General or the resumption of the talks in line with that resolution.

(Signed) Özer KORAY
Representative

APPENDIX

Letter dated 12 July 1990 from Mr. Rauf Denktas to the President in Office of the Council of the European Communities

I have the honour to attach a memorandum (see attachment) relating to the recent application addressed to you by the Greek Cypriot authorities in Cyprus. You will, I am sure, appreciate the very great concern that this "application" causes to the Turkish Cypriot people of Cyprus. I should therefore be grateful if you could convey this memorandum to the Council of Ministers for their consideration.

(Signed) Rauf R. DENKTAS
President

ATTACHMENT

TURKISH CYPRIOT MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN RESPECT OF AN "APPLICATION" FOR MEMBERSHIP BY "THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS"

1. The President in office of the Council of Ministers has been sent three applications, dated 3 July 1990, by a body calling itself "the Government of the Republic of Cyprus" seeking membership for "Cyprus" (not "the Republic of Cyprus") in the three European Communities. In this connection the Turkish Cypriot side respectfully requests the Council of Ministers to take into consideration the following objections and observations.

Cyprus is a two-community island.

2. The basis of the Turkish Cypriot opposition to the present application is that the Republic of Cyprus as originally conceived and brought into being in 1960 was founded on the existence of two separate and politically equal communities - one Turkish, the other Greek. Whatever may have happened since then - and the essential elements will be recalled below - the fact remains that there are still two separate communities in Cyprus and a legal background which recognizes the separateness and political equality of these two communities. Even if the Greek Cypriot community has in a number of contexts succeeded in assuming the mantle of "the Republic of Cyprus", that is not a consideration that can now entitle it to represent the whole of Cyprus in so fundamental a development as the acquisition of membership of the European Communities or at all.

Membership of the ECs is unworkable in a divided island.

3. Unlike any other international relationship into which the Greek Cypriot community has purported to enter - albeit illegally - in the name of "the Republic of Cyprus", membership of the European Communities would involve a degree of participation by the Communities in the life of their Members which is quite unworkable in the circumstances presently prevailing in Cyprus and pending a mutually acceptable comprehensive settlement in the form of a bi-communal, bi-zonal, federal republic. The European Communities cannot have, and should not consider having, as a single member, an island which is divided into two parts, each separately governed and divided by a firm boundary, when membership demands, among other things, free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, not to mention the application of common policies on such important matters as agriculture, fisheries and transport throughout the territories of the Members of the Communities.

The application is misconceived.

4. The applicant, in submitting an application in respect of "Cyprus" (not, it should be noted, "the Republic of Cyprus") suggests a unity of the island which is not supportable either in law or in fact. It will be useful to recall the essential elements in the situation. They are, regrettably, too often overlooked.

Early recognition of the two-community nature of Cyprus.

5. There are two different peoples in Cyprus. This historical fact was underlined by the British Government during the period when Cyprus was approaching independence. The British Colonial Secretary, Mr.Lennox Boyd said on 19 December 1956: "... it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination should be effected in such a manner that the Turkish Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall, in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for themselves their future status. In other words, Her Majesty's Government recognize that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options". This statement was confirmed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Macmillan, on 26 June 1958, who described these assurances as "pledges".

Bi-communal essentials of the 1960 settlement.

6. Despite the reference to "partition" as an option, in answer to Greek Cypriot claims for union of Cyprus with Greece, this was not the solution eventually adopted. Instead, a compromise was reached along the lines of a bi-communal State, in which the respective legal and political positions of the two communities were carefully regulated. Absolutely fundamental to the division of power between the two communities was the idea that Cyprus could not be ruled by one community to the exclusion of the other. Both communities had to participate as partners in all decision making and in the administration of the island. Equally fundamental was the idea that the greater numbers of the Greek Cypriot community could not be used to impose unacceptable policies or decisions upon the Turkish Cypriot community. Adequate checks and balances were provided in the constitution for the preservation of the national identity and partnership status of each community.

International and constitutional nature of the 1960 settlement.

7. These fundamentals were incorporated in what has come to be called "the 1960 settlement". It is characterized by the fact that it is both an international and a constitutional settlement. Thus the subsequent conduct of the Greek Cypriot community has to be judged not only in terms of constitutional law but also of international law.

Strict division of power between the two communities.

8. The 1960 settlement consisted, first, of the Zurich and London Agreements of 1959. These were international treaties which raised to the level of international legal obligation the undertakings given by the parties. Thus, the Zurich Agreement, concluded between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers on 11 February 1959, established the Basic Structure of the emergent Republic of Cyprus. It provided, as basic articles for inclusion in the Cyprus Constitution, a clear and balanced division of power between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, including provision for a Greek Cypriot President, elected solely by Greek Cypriots, and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-President, elected solely by Turkish Cypriots, and seventy percent - thirty percent distribution of seats in the Council of Ministers and the legislature, as well as the same allocation of places in the administration. Also, the President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President were granted veto powers which would have enabled them to block measures prejudicial to their respective communities. Executive power "ensued from the President and Vice-President acting conjointly." Another essential feature of the basic articles was the specific exclusion of the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State.

International guarantee of the Settlement.

9. The undertakings given in these Agreements were reinforced by the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, as well as by incorporation in the Cyprus Constitution itself. The parties to these treaties were the Republic of Cyprus, on whose behalf "the Greek Cypriot President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President" signed, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. These treaties created for the parties rights and duties under international law. In the Treaty of Guarantee especially the Republic of Cyprus undertook to ensure respect for its constitution, while Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of this undertaking, recognized and guaranteed the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of the Constitution. This Treaty also expressly provided that "in so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserved the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty."

Early Greek Cypriot rejection of Turkish Cypriot participation.

10. Within three years of the conclusion of these solemn compacts the Greek Cypriots had embarked upon a deliberate course of subverting the basic articles. This culminated in the resignation of the neutral President of the Constitutional Court and the eventual denial of each and every right given to Turkish Cypriots under the Constitution. In pursuance of the so-called "Akritas Plan" that was aimed at uniting the island with Greece, the Turkish Cypriots were ousted from their guaranteed positions in the organs

of government, the political equality and the vested rights of the Turkish Cypriots were denied, while the Greek Cypriot members of the House of Representatives enacted, in flagrant violation of the 1960 settlement and the basic articles of the Constitution, legislation providing for the operation of various organs of government without Turkish Cypriot participation. In June 1967 the Greek Cypriot legislature went so far as unanimously to pass a resolution in favour of "enosis", union with Greece, so clearly prohibited by Article 185 of the Constitution.

Separation of the Turkish Cypriot community.

11. Since December 1963, the Turkish Cypriot community, faced by discrimination, threats and physical attacks was, for its self-preservation, compelled gradually to withdraw into self-administering enclaves, cut off from public services and unassisted by public monies. The fact of administrative and territorial division between the communities was acknowledged eleven years later by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom in the Declaration of 30 July 1974, which "noted the existence in practice in the Republic of Cyprus of two autonomous administrations, that of the Greek Cypriot community and that of the Turkish Cypriot community." It is further attested by the maintenance of a dividing line across the island by UNFICYP, which had arrived in Cyprus with the consent of both sides in March 1964 as a result of the break up of the partnership state and its administration. In due course, in 1975, the Turkish Cypriot administration which had been administering Turkish Cypriots since the breakdown of the legitimate partnership government, developed into the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, by way of adaptation to the circumstances, and for the purpose of creating the federated Turkish Cypriot wing of a future federal republic of Cyprus, thus re-establishing the defunct partnership state in a federal form.

Constitutional illegitimacy of Greek Cypriot action acknowledged.

12. The lack of constitutional foundation for the Greek Cypriot administration was acknowledged by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom in a Declaration of 30 July 1974 when they recorded that "among the constitutional questions to be discussed should be that of an immediate return to constitutional legitimacy, the Vice-President assuming the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution." Such words could not have been used if the prevailing condition at the time had been one of adherence to the Constitution. In fact Makarios had openly declared the 1960 Agreements and the Constitution to be "dead and buried", and he offered Turkish Cypriots minority rights in what he regarded a Greek Cypriot state. Here was a plain recognition, therefore, that there was not a legitimate government representing the whole population. And the reference to the need for the Vice-President to assume the functions provided for under the 1960 Constitution, coupled with the well-known fact that the Vice-President had been

Turkish and had not voluntarily renounced the exercise of his functions, indicates appreciation that he had been unlawfully excluded from his office - an exclusion which in constitutional terms means - inter alia - that the Turkish Cypriot community was deprived of its right under Article 57 of the Constitution to veto decisions relating to foreign affairs (or, conversely, to approve such decisions by deliberately acquiescing in them) and the collapse of the partnership state.

1974 - 'Enosis' thwarted by guarantor action of Turkey.

13. Prior to this, however, certain Greek and Greek Cypriot elements had carried a stage further their repudiation of the prohibition of "enosis". For the purpose of bringing about immediate 'Enosis', in July 1974 a Greek-inspired and militarily supported coup took place against Archbishop Makarios, who himself had previously maintained that by destroying the constitutional order he had brought Cyprus to the "nearest point to Enosis".. In the exercise of its rights and duties as a guarantor of the 1960 settlement and upon the urgent plea of the Turkish Cypriot side for help, Turkey landed forces in Cyprus in order to safeguard the Turkish Cypriot population and prevent a takeover of the island by Greece. They freed the northern part of the island from Greek and Greek Cypriot forces, which Makarios had described to the Security Council on 19 July 1974 as "forces of invasion from Greece", and made it a haven for the whole Turkish Cypriot population including those stranded in the enclaves in the south - a process which was completed by the 1975 Agreement on the Voluntary Regrouping of Populations. There now co-exist on the island two separate administrations - the Greek Cypriot administration in the South which has assumed the role of "the Republic of Cyprus" and the Turkish Cypriot administration which has established itself as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in view of the refusal of the Greek Cypriot side to agree to share power with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of equality as envisaged in the 1977 and 1979 High Level Agreements.

Greek Cypriots not the lawful government of Cyprus.

14. In the circumstances set out above, it will be readily understood why the Turkish Cypriots regard as unlawful the assumption by the Greek Cypriots of the role of "the Republic of Cyprus". That Republic was as ordained and in the image of the 1960 settlement. The Greek Cypriots overthrew that settlement in December 1963. Yet they appear to have been accepted internationally as the appropriate representatives of Cyprus. This cannot be right, legally or morally, and no one should be surprised by the view that the Turkish Cypriots take of the situation.

International illegality of Greek Cypriot action.

15. The Turkish Cypriots believe that the unilateral application by the Greek Cypriots to join the Communities is an international act of an entirely different order of intensity and significance to anything that has come before. The Council of Ministers of the European Communities may not lawfully disregard the illegality of the position and conduct of the Greek Cypriot regime in Cyprus when the latter purports to present itself as the "government of the Republic of Cyprus." The objection now raised by the TRNC on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot people to the validity of the application rests upon the lack of entitlement of the Greek Cypriot community to make the application in the name of "Cyprus" or, indeed, of "the Republic of Cyprus." This objection rests only indirectly upon the constitutional illegitimacy of the Greek Cypriot regime for it is possible to conceive of cases in which merely constitutional illegitimacy would not preclude a regime from seeking admission to an international organization on behalf of a State. However, where, as in this case, the constitutional illegitimacy occasions an international illegitimacy, the position is quite different and cannot be ignored by the European Communities. Moreover, in the case of Cyprus where the bi-communality of the state and its government was the precondition for legitimacy, this unilateral act by Greek Cypriots is a clear and unacceptable action to impose their political will on the Turkish Cypriots on a matter which will affect generations to come.

Greek Cypriot application violates international and constitutional ban on Enosis.

16. The application is also open to objection on the ground, arising from Article 1 of the Treaty of Guarantee, and echoed in Article 185 of the Constitution, that the Republic of Cyprus has undertaken "not to participate in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever." This limitation is broad enough to prohibit the link with Greece that a membership initiated and negotiated by the Greek Cypriots alone would bring about, even within the framework of the European Communities.

Comparison with Germany is false.

17. Greek Cypriot awareness of the vulnerability of the application is suggested by the following report in the press (see The Wall Street Journal, 5 July 1990) that Mr.Iacovou, the Foreign Minister of the Greek Cypriot regime, said:

> "the island's political situation shouldn't have an effect on his country's membership application. He drew an analogy with Germany, saying that the division of that country into East and West had never been viewed as a barrier to EC membership."

The "analogy" is quite false and reveals precisely the weakness of the Greek Cypriot application. When the Federal Republic of Germany became an original member of the European Communities, no claim was made by it that the territorial scope of its membership extended beyond the area under its actual control. It did not claim to represent East Germany for purposes of becoming a member.* It is indeed significant that the only territorial matters raised by the FRG related to the position of Land Berlin and the Saar. In the present situation, however, it is evident that the Greek Cypriots do not seek to limit their application in a comparable manner.

Application is a nullity. No action should be taken on it.

18. The present opposition to the Greek Cypriot applications is of a fundamental nature. It arises in limine. The internationally unlawful character of the authority that purports to make the application deprives it of the capacity so to act, while, the scope of the application and the manner of its making both taint the application with invalidity. It is a nullity. In law, therefore, there exists no application that the Council of Ministers may refer to the commission for an opinion and no application that the commission may properly receive. The suggestion is, accordingly, respectfully made that the proper course is for the Council of Ministers to take no action on the application. If, nonetheless, this council of Ministers should feel that it is necessary or desirable that the commission should express an opinion on the validity of the application, then the reference to the Commission should be precisely limited to this. It should not be a reference to the commission for an opinion on the substance of the application.

TRNC would welcome EC membership but only after settlement.

19. Notwithstanding this the TRNC does not wish to create the impression that it is opposed to the eventual membership of the European Communities by a State of Cyprus restored to legality and stability by a settlement freely negotiated between parties of equal standing. When such a political settlement has been achieved, the Turkish Cypriot community will be no less desirous than the Greek Cypriot community to secure membership for the whole of Cyprus in a manner that will ensure that the benefits of such

* A leading authority of the international status of Germany, Professor F.A.Mann, has said: "... the Federal Government is not the Government in the East. It is, therefore, unable to render treaties effective in respect of the East. Hence, it cannot conclude treaties which require implementation in the East. Nor, it appears, has the Federal Republic ever attempted to do so." (Studies in International Law (1973), p. 702.)

membership, as well as its burdens, are enjoyed and borne by both communities genuinely, without discrimination between them.

Greek Cypriot admission would mean a second vote for Greece.

20. In the meantime, it must be recognized that the effect of the admission to the European Communities of the Greek Cypriot side under the assumed title of "the Republic of Cyprus" represented as it is today exclusively by the Greek Cypriot element in the island would in effect, be to give to Greece a second vote in all the deliberations of the Communities. There is no room for the pretence that, left to itself, the Greek Cypriot community, irrevocably committed in spirit as it has always been to union with Greece, would act within the organs of the European Community as anything other than a proxy of Greece. The only way to ensure that Cyprus acts as a fully independent member of the European Communities is to insist that membership should not be given to it until there is reasonable certainty that its foreign and economic policy will not be subservient to the interests of any neighbor. That can only be assured by the establishment within Cyprus of a system of government reflecting the existence of the two communities, each possessing the capacity to prevent the exploitation of the country's position for the sole or disproportionate benefit of the other.

Application violates most recent UN Security Council resolution.

21. In its most recent resolution on Cyprus, of 12 March 1990 (649(1990)), the UN Security Council called on "the parties concerned to refrain from any action that could aggravate the situation." In the specialized vocabulary that has developed in this context, the words "the parties" means not only the two Cypriot communities but the interested governments, including, with special reference to the present context, Greece. The present move clearly aggravates the situation by destroying the equality of status between the two communities that is the essential foundation for the continuance of negotiations on the wider question.

Membership can only grow out of settlement. Not vice versa.

22. It must be realized that the entry into the European Communities of a uniquely Greek Cypriot state cannot contribute to the resolution of the differences between the two communities. Participation in the European Communities can only grow out of the creation of a new Republic of Cyprus that fully reflects the proper status and role of both communities.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21399
18 July 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith text of a letter dated 17 July 1990 addressed to Your Excellency from the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Cyprus, His Excellency Mr. George Iacovou, requesting the convening of a meeting of the Security Council.

(Signed) Andreas MAVROMMATIS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Cyprus to
the United Nations

Annex I

Letter dated 17 July 1990 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council

I wish to refer to recent developments regarding the city of Varosha and express my grave concern at information according to which the military status quo in the fenced area of Varosha will be altered in a way intended to facilitate the opening of the area to settlement by people other than its inhabitants. Mr. Denktash stated yesterday that Varosha will not be opened for settlement, at this stage, implying that such illegal actions are envisaged in the future.

As you may recall resolution 550 (1984) of the Security Council considered, inter alia, "attempts to settle any part of Varosha by people other than its inhabitants as inadmissible" and "called for the transfer of this area to the administration of the United Nations". It further decided "to remain seized of the situation with a view to taking urgent and appropriate measures in the event of non-implementation of its resolution 541 (1983) and the present resolution".

It should be stressed in the first place that the mandatory provisions of resolution 550 (1984) have not been implemented by Turkey so far and that despite assurances by Turkey and Mr. Denktash no restoration of the status quo has been achieved with regard to the three hotels which are being used in contravention of resolution 550 (1984) since 1986. Instead new illegalities are contemplated which would constitute a clear violation of the status quo in Varosha that could endanger the maintenance of the cease-fire and have serious repercussions on peace and security in the area.

It is the position of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus that the United Nations and in particular the Security Council, which has the responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, is under an obligation and a responsibility to take such urgent measures, under the Charter, as warranted by the gravity of the situation, to secure that no violation of the status quo takes place and to promote the implementation of resolution 550 (1984) of the Security Council. In this respect I wish to reiterate our position that the said provisions should be fully implemented by transferring the area to the administration of the United Nations and allowing the rightful owners of the city to return to their homes and properties.

I, therefore, call upon Your Excellency to convene a meeting of the Security Council to consider the situation.

George IACOVOU
Minister

Annex II

Letter dated 18 July 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Further to the letter dated 17 July 1990 by the Foreign Minister of Cyprus and further to our conversation of today, I would like to inform that the threatened change of the status quo in the fenced area of Varosha took place this morning.

This illegality makes the taking of urgent action by the Security Council, in order to restore the status quo ante, imperative.

(Signed) Andreas MAVROMMATIS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Cyprus to the United Nations

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21400
19 July 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 2930th meeting of the Security Council, held on 19 July 1990, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item "The situation in Cyprus", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the members:

"The members of the Council have considered the Secretary-General's report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/21393). They are unanimous in giving their full support to the Secretary-General's current effort to assist the two communities to reach a just and lasting solution. They agree with his assessment of recent developments, share his concern about the lack of progress, and endorse his plan of action.

"The members of the Security Council reaffirm their resolution 649 (1990) of 12 March 1990 which was accepted by both sides, and reiterate the importance they attach to an early negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem.

"The members of the Council call on the leaders of the two communities to co-operate fully with the Secretary-General on the basis of his plan of action and to arrive, on an urgent basis, at an agreed outline of an overall agreement. In line with resolution 649 (1990), they request the Secretary-General to make suggestions, as necessary, to assist the two communities in arriving at an agreed outline.

"The members of the Council again call on the parties concerned to refrain, especially at this sensitive stage in the process, from any action or statement that could aggravate the situation. They express their concern over any action which contravenes paragraph 5 of resolution 550 (1984) and paragraph 5 of resolution 649 (1990). They call upon both communities to concentrate their efforts on promoting mutual confidence and reconciliation.

"The members of the Council request the Secretary-General to inform the Council by 31 October 1990 about the implementation of his plan of action."

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21401
19 July 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 18 JULY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Iranian armed forces have committed the following violations of the cease-fire provisions:

1. At 1120 hours on 11 June 1990, an Iranian excavator built a 1-metre-high and 20-metre-long earth embankment on the Mashakh Shakwat range at co-ordinates 702641, 2,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

2. At 1200 hours on 11 June 1990, five Iranians were seen digging a slit trench and two firing positions at the foot of hill 1180 at co-ordinates 994811, 2,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

3. At 1420 hours on 11 June 1990, five Iranians built a mound on the summit of Nawukhan at co-ordinates 208648, 1,400 metres from our I Army Corps units.

4. At 2200 hours on 11 June 1990, the Iranians fired five tracer shots from a heavy machine-gun from hill 2248 at co-ordinates 9222 in the direction of the positions of the 9th Platoon, 3rd Squadron, 3rd Regiment, 504th Brigade, at hill 1498 at co-ordinates 8922, 2,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

5. At 1100 hours on 11 June 1990, nine Iranians built a new observation post and two positions at co-ordinates 531716, 1,700 metres from our II Army Corps units.

6. On 11 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a grader, a bulldozer and four dump trucks was seen carrying earth to the new embankment in no man's land at co-ordinates 945798, 450 metres from our III Army Corps units.

7. Between 0830 hours and 1100 hours on 11 June 1990, an Iranian bulldozer was building a 30-metre-long and 2.5-metre-high earth embankment west of the Ayn al-Khush - Dehloran main road at co-ordinates 409945, 7,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

8. At 0640 hours on 11 June 1990, two Iranian excavators were raising the height of the earth rampart at co-ordinates 534301, 850 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

9. At 0950 hours on 11 June 1990, three Iranians were seen raising the height of the Iranian tower by two metres at co-ordinates 313584, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

10. At 1110 hours on 11 June 1990, five excavators were seen to the rear of the Iranian embankment repairing the embankment at co-ordinates 330570, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

11. At 1200 hours on 12 June 1990, the Iranians built a new shelter near the slit trench inside their positions south-east of Yusuf Hayy at co-ordinates 869819, 2,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

12. At 2000 hours on 12 June 1990, the Iranians rebuilt the Iranian post at co-ordinates 808231, 700 metres from our II Army Corps units, using stone, whereas sheet iron had been used before.

13. At 0730 hours on 12 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two rollers and a grader was seen strengthening the new embankment at co-ordinates 998734, 500 metres from our III Army Corps units.

14. At 0750 hours on 12 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two bulldozers, a roller and four dump trucks was seen strengthening the new embankment at co-ordinates 944798, 450 metres from our III Army Corps units.

15. At 1815 hours on 12 June 1990, the Iranians set up a small water pump on the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 938853, 1,300 metres from our III Army Corps units.

16. At 0740 hours on 12 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, four dump trucks and a roller was strengthening the rampart at co-ordinates 535299, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

17. At 0700 hours on 12 June 1990, two groups of Iranian personnel proceeded to dig a communications trench, the first group, consisting of 30 men, at co-ordinates 274697 and the second, consisting of 50 men, at co-ordinates 271699, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

18. At 0830 hours on 12 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two rollers and two dump trucks proceeded to repair the rampart at co-ordinates 371596, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

19. At 1130 hours on 13 June 1990, a group of Iranians built a new rest shelter inside their old positions south of Hasanabad at co-ordinates 726494, 500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

20. On 13 June 1990, the Iranian engineering unit still continued to work on the strengthening of the Iranian embankment in no man's land at co-ordinates 996728, 350 metres from our III Army Corps units.

21. On 13 June 1990, the Iranians proceeded to strengthen the new embankment in no man's land at co-ordinates 944804, 450 metres from our III Army Corps units.

22. On 13 June 1990, the Iranians built two earth observation posts, 3 to 4 metres high, the first at co-ordinates 852349 and the second at co-ordinates 845349, 2,000 to 2,100 metres from our III Army Corps units.

23. At 1025 hours on 13 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of two dump trucks, a backhoe excavator and a Poclain began to operate in the Curve area at co-ordinates 582719, 1,200 metres from our Army Corps units.

24. At 0830 hours on 13 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and seven dump trucks was seen raising the level of the earth rampart at co-ordinates 498373, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

25. At 0730 hours on 13 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench at co-ordinates 274699 and 274697, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

26. At 0800 hours on 13 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench at co-ordinates 264704, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

27. At 0830 hours on 13 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench at co-ordinates 340581 and 330572, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

28. At 1820 hours on 13 June 1990, five Iranians proceeded to strengthen the metal tower at co-ordinates 313584, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

29. At 1500 hours on 14 June 1990, the Iranians pitched a new tent west of hill 2039 at co-ordinates 737642, 3,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

30. At 1735 hours on 14 June 1990, the Iranians set up a BKC machine-gun, 30 metres in front of their positions and north-west of Mount Talish at co-ordinates 325843, 2,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

31. Between 0630 and 1130 hours on 14 June 1990, an Iranian Poclain excavator was seen extending by 200 metres the length of the slit trench at co-ordinates 236053, 5,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units, bringing the total length to 3,100 metres.

32. Between 0800 and 1100 hours on 14 June 1990, an Iranian bulldozer was seen extending the 25-metre-long and 2.5-metre-long new embankment west of the Ayn al-Khush - Dehloran main road and north of Ali Nasr at co-ordinates 409945, 7,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units, bringing the total length to 60 metres.

33. At 0915 hours on 14 June 1990, 10 Iranians were seen building a position of blocks at co-ordinates 670485, 4,000 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

34. At 0700 hours on 14 June 1990, four Iranians were seen building two positions, one of sandbags and the other of blocks at co-ordinates 555208, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

35. At 0730 hours on 14 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench at co-ordinates 274699 and 274697, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

36. At 0800 hours on 14 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench from co-ordinates 346587 to co-ordinates 340580, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

37. At 0900 hours on 14 June 1990, seven Iranians were seen building a position of sandbags at co-ordinates 668155, 1,000 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

38. At 0900 hours on 14 June 1990, five Iranians were seen unloading blocks from a vehicle onto the embankment and placing them in the communications trench at co-ordinates 278692, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

39. At 0940 hours on 14 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a roller and a dump truck was seen levelling earth on the rampart at co-ordinates 372594, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

40. Between 0850 and 1200 hours on 15 June 1990, an Iranian Poclain excavator was seen extending by 250 metres the slit trench north of Musian at co-ordinates 234055, 5,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units, bringing the total length to 3,350 metres.

41. At 1930 hours on 15 June 1990, a group of Iranians estimated to number eight built a position at co-ordinates 669971, 4,000 metres from our VI Army Corps units.

42. At 0700 hours on 15 June 1990, the Iranians built three guard posts of sandbags at co-ordinates 559203 and 549215, 650 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

43. At 0900 hours on 15 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench at co-ordinates 274697, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

44. At 0910 hours on 15 June 1990, the Iranians unloaded blocks from a vehicle into the communications trench at co-ordinates 278694, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

45. At 1910 hours on 15 June 1990, the Iranians dug three 2-metre-wide and 4-metre-long communications trenches at co-ordinates 375697, 500 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

46. At 1945 hours on 15 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench on the earth rampart at co-ordinates 354594, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

47. At 1840 hours on 15 June 1990, the Iranians hoisted an Iranian flag in no man's land at co-ordinates 927847, 150 metres from our III Army Corps units.

48. At 0720 hours on 16 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, two bulldozers, a grader, a roller and four dump trucks was seen strengthening the new embankment in no man's land at co-ordinates 944797, 450 metres from our III Army Corps units.

49. At 1120 hours on 16 June 1990, a Land Cruiser automobile carrying five Iranians was seen coming from the Iranian rear and stopping in no man's land at co-ordinates 997738, 150 metres from our III Army Corps units. They carried out observations for five minutes and withdrew to the Iranian rear.

50. At 1800 hours on 16 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench at co-ordinates 294674, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

51. At 0730 hours on 16 June 1990, a hoist was seen lowering four semicircular concrete shelter sections at co-ordinates 278693, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

52. At 0720 hours on 16 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench at co-ordinates 274697 and 274699, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

53. At 0730 hours on 16 June 1990, the Iranians surfaced the walls of a communications trench with blocks at co-ordinates 278693, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

54. At 0645 hours on 17 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a bulldozer and five dump trucks was seen strengthening the new embankment in no man's land at co-ordinates 998734, 500 metres from our III Army Corps units.

55. Between 0740 and 1130 hours on 17 June 1990, a Poclain excavator was observed extending by 200 metres the slit trench at co-ordinates 234056, 5,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units, bringing the total length to 3,550 metres.

56. At 1830 hours on 17 June 1990, four Iranian boats were seen carrying a group of Iranians estimated to number 15, who were carrying fortification materials from the first Iranian embankment to no man's land for the purpose of building a firing post at co-ordinates 922933, 2,000 metres from our II Army Corps units.

57. At 0730 and 0935 hours on 17 June 1990, the Iranians dug three communications trenches at co-ordinates 278692, 274697 and 330572, 500 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

58. At 1850 hours on 18 June 1990, three Iranian boats carrying 15 men were seen fastening down sheet iron in the flood area in no man's land at co-ordinates 922933, 2,200 metres from our III Army Corps units.

59. On 18 June 1990, the Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a bulldozer and five dump trucks still continued to work on the strengthening of the new embankment in no man's land at co-ordinates 998734, 500 metres from our III Army Corps units.

60. At 0930 hours on 18 June 1990, the Iranians built a monitoring and observation post on the earth mound to the rear of the first embankment at co-ordinates 886351, 2,150 metres from our III Army Corps units.

61. At 0930 hours on 18 June 1990, a khaki-coloured Iranian helicopter was observed at an altitude of 800 metres flying in a north-south direction, south of Abu Ghurayb. At 0945 hours, it landed in the military zone east of Ayn al-Khush at co-ordinates 5088, 11 kilometres from our IV Army Corps units.

62. At 0730 hours on 18 June 1990, the Iranians built and topped a 20-metre-long wall for the communications trench at co-ordinates 278692, 400 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

63. At 0730 hours on 18 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 25-metre-long communications trench at co-ordinates 274699, 500 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

64. At 0750 hours on 18 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a grader, three rollers and 10 dump trucks was seen repairing a road at co-ordinates 449507, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

65. At 1900 hours on 18 June 1990, two Iranian trucks were seen, each carrying three concrete pipes, with a fork-lift, which lowered the pipes at co-ordinates 303631, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

66. At 2000 hours on 18 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 100-metre-long communications trench from co-ordinates 309588 to co-ordinates 312581, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

67. At 2000 hours on 18 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 12-metre-long position in the slit trench that they had dug from co-ordinates 268704 to 279693, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

68. At 1800 hours on 19 June 1990, six Iranians were seen setting up 80 metres of barbed wire in front of the village of Tappeh Maran and in front of the first embankment at co-ordinates 718279, 3,000 metres from our II Army Corps units.

69. At 0530 hours on 19 June 1990, the Iranians were seen digging five new posts at a depth of 30 to 40 centimetres, positioned at equal intervals between Iranian posts 6 and 7 at co-ordinates 573483 and 574485 and 20 metres forward. At 1910 hours a Land Cruiser vehicle carrying 15 Iranians was seen coming from the Iranian rear to Iranian post 6 at co-ordinates 573483, and, at 2030 hours, they distributed themselves over the new Iranian posts that they had dug in no man's land. They had the following weapons in their possession: a 12.7-millimetre Dushka, manned by three Iranians; two launchers; and 10 GC rifles. This took place 480 metres from our II Army Corps units.

70. At 2337 hours on 19 June 1990, one of the Iranians fired three GC rifle shots in the air in the direction of the 1st Regiment, 606th Infantry Brigade, from no man's land at co-ordinates 573483, 480 metres from our II Army Corps units. At 0125 hours on 20 June 1990, two GC rifle shots were fired in the air in the same direction.

71. At 0800 hours on 19 June 1990, the Iranians hoisted an Iranian flag in no man's land in front of the first Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 943802, 400 metres from our III Army Corps units.

72. On 19 June 1990, the Iranian engineering unit still continued to work on the strengthening of the new embankment in no man's land at co-ordinates 998735, 500 metres from our III Army Corps units.

73. At 1745 hours on 19 June 1990, the Iranians moved an infantry platoon consisting of 27 men, divided into three squadrons and carrying their personal weapons, from the first Iranian embankment in the direction of the spit of land in no man's land at co-ordinates 943812, 500 metres from our III Army Corps units. After 30 minutes, they returned to the embankment.

74. At 0630 hours on 19 June 1990, the Iranians built a 15-metre-long communications trench from the interior with blocks at co-ordinates 278693, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

75. At 0630 hours on 19 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 50-metre-long communications trench at co-ordinates 274697, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

76. At 0630 hours on 19 June 1990, an Iranian hoist was seen lifting four semicircular concrete shelter sections from the rear of the embankment to the top of the embankment and placing them in the apertures in the Iranian embankment parallel to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 278694, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

77. At 0750 hours on 19 June 1990, an Iranian hoist was seen lifting three semicircular concrete shelter sections from the rear of the embankment to the top of the embankment and placing them in the apertures in the Iranian embankment parallel to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 277694, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

78. At 1745 hours on 19 June 1990, an Iranian hoist was seen positioning a 15-metre-high observation tower in the Zafilah area at co-ordinates 304663, 1,400 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

79. At 1800 hours on 19 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 150- to 200-metre-long slit trench in the Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 299659, 950 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

80. At 0815 hours on 19 June 1990, an Iranian hoist was seen lifting three semicircular concrete shelter sections from the rear of the embankment to the top of the embankment and placing them in the apertures in the Iranian embankment parallel to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 276695, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

81. At 1100 hours on 20 June 1990, five Iranians were seen pitching a new tent inside the Iranian positions north-west of Tit Ya'in at co-ordinates 368835, 2,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

82. At 1915 hours on 20 June 1990, a Land Cruiser vehicle was seen coming from the Iranian rear to the Iranian post at co-ordinates 573483. Twelve armed men descended from it, and the vehicle then returned empty to the Iranian rear. At 2045 hours, they distributed themselves among the new posts built by the Iranians on 19 June 1990 at co-ordinates 573483 and 574485, 400 metres from our II Army Corps units. They had with them 10 GC rifles and two RPG-7 launchers.

83. Between 0710 and 1130 hours on 20 June 1990, a Poclain excavator was observed extending the slit trench by 450 metres in a northerly direction, bringing the total length to 4,000 metres, at co-ordinates 231061, 5,500 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

84. At 0630 hours on 20 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench on the Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 274699, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

85. At 0640 hours on 20 June 1990, a hoist was seen lifting four semicircular concrete sections to the rear of the embankment and positioning them at co-ordinates 276695, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

86. At 0645 hours on 20 June 1990, the Iranians built and surfaced with blocks the 15-metre-long wall of a communications trench at co-ordinates 278693, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

87. At 0700 hours on 20 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 100-metre-long communications trench on the Iranian embankment at co-ordinates 299657, 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

88. At 1850, 1900, 2030 and 2040 hours on 20 June 1990, the Iranians dug five communications trenches, the first, 150 metres long and 1.5 metres deep, from co-ordinates 274696 to co-ordinates 276695; the second, 15 metres long, at co-ordinates 308604; the third, 1,000 metres long and 0.5 metres deep, from co-ordinates 299651 to co-ordinates 299629; the fourth, 7 metres long, at co-ordinates 303622; and the fifth, 2 metres long, at co-ordinates 299641, 600 to 1,000 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

89. At 1900 hours on 20 June 1990, the Iranians dug four 2-metre-wide positions at 10-metre intervals at co-ordinates 299641, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

Flooding operation

The Iranian side is continuing its flooding operation in the direction of our III Army Corps units opposite the defensive positions of our military units. The water levels have been as follows:

90. 11 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 15-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-130 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-105 centimetres.

91. 12 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 15-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-130 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-105 centimetres.

92. 13 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 15-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-125 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-100 centimetres.

93. 14 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 15-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-125 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-100 centimetres.

94. 15 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 10-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-125 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-100 centimetres.

95. 16 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 10-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-95 centimetres.

96. 17 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 10-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-95 centimetres.

97. 18 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 20-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-95 centimetres.

98. 19 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 20-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-95 centimetres.

99. 20 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 20-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-90 centimetres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21402
20 July 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The attached letter dated 20 July 1990 from the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations was addressed to the President of the Security Council. In accordance with the request contained in the letter, the text is being circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Annex

Letter dated 20 July 1990 from the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to forward to you the text of the special announcement made on 20 July 1990 by President Roh Tae Woo of the Republic of Korea of steps for grand inter-Korean exchanges of people.

It would be highly appreciated if you would have this letter and the enclosed text circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hong-choo HYUN
Ambassador

Enclosure

Text of the special announcement made on 20 July 1990 by President of the Republic of Korea on Steps for Grand Inter-Korean Exchanges of People

I hereby announce a decision to promote exchanges of people between South and North Korea with a view toward achieving peaceful unification at the earliest possible date now that the world is undergoing momentous changes highlighting the end to Cold War confrontation and the emergence of a new order of detente. In my special declaration of 7 July 1988, I enunciated a policy of ending confrontation between the one people in the South and the North and forging a partnership and cooperative ties between the two parts of our land. On October 18 of that year, I went before the General Assembly of the United Nations and in a speech proposed that the barrier dividing the Korean Peninsula into southern and northern halves be dismantled to permit free exchanges in all fields with the aim of realizing peace and the unification of our land.

Two years later, the old world order is being fundamentally transformed. A tide of openness and reconciliation has torn away the Iron Curtain separating the East and the West and is now shaping a new world in which nations are cooperating with each other regardless of differences in ideology and political systems. This tide of reform has collapsed the Berlin Wall and is moving West and East Germany into unity.

The time has come to end the total division and Cold War confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, as well. Korea must not remain the world's only land still partitioned by Cold War politics. The fact that compatriots in the South and the North are still unable to visit each other is a shame on us who are a proud people with a rich cultural heritage that has evolved over many millennia. Such a state of affairs should not continue any longer.

We must achieve peaceful unification within the 1990's so that the 21st century will be an era of glory for our people. Both the South and the North should boldly do what needs to be done to reconcile each other and integrate our people.

Thus, I hereby proclaim the five day span around the 45th anniversary of national liberation, which is August 15th, a period for grand inter-Korean exchanges of people. For five days beginning on August 13, we will keep Panmunjom open as the passage and will accept brethren from the North without restrictions. We will allow them to freely visit any place in the South and meet anyone whom they want to meet. We will provide all possible manner of convenience to our brethren visiting the South and will provide any assistance during their stay.

We will also take steps to allow any of our citizens to visit North Korea via Panmunjom without restrictions. We will guarantee North Korean brethren visiting the South personal safety and safe return home. We expect North Korea to take reciprocal measures.

I hope that North Korea will open not only the northern portion of Panmunjom but its entire territory as well to permit people from the South to freely visit any place in the North. I hope that like us, the North will accept, without restrictions, brethren in the South who wish to visit North Korea.

If we can successfully exchange our compatriots on Independence Day this year, we should be able to routinize mutual visits on and around other national holidays as Ch'usok (The Harvest Moon Festival), Solnal (Lunar New Year's Day) and Hanshik (a day in early April set aside for visits to ancestral graves). We should build upon such exchanges of holiday visitors to clear the way for unrestricted mutual visits at any time. Mutual visits and exchanges between our compatriots in the South and the North are an indispensable step toward unification.

On 1 January of this year, President Kim Il-Sung of North Korea also proposed that the South and North Korean societies be completely opened and that free travel be allowed between the two parts of Korea. In this context, I am convinced that there will be no obstacle to realizing both exchanges of our compatriots and the full opening of both the South and the North on Independence Day this year. Even if North Korea cannot agree to mutual exchanges at this time for some unavoidable reason, we will one-sidedly open our society completely to North Korean brethren.

In the near future, we will permit foreigners to freely travel between South and North Korea through Panmunjom. The Government will take all necessary measures and make all necessary preparations to implement what has just been announced.

It is high time that the South and the North embarked on genuine efforts to integrate the Korean people by transcending ideology and politics. Consider how magnificent and great an age the 21st century could be for our people if only the country is unified and the 70 million Koreans become one again. With such a vision, let us all participate in the endeavour to fulfil our national yearning.

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/21403
20 July 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 JULY 1990 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that at 0430 hours (local time) of 23 June 1990, Iraqi forces shot an Iranian soldier at the N.T.P. 509-439 on the map of Khosrow Abad. Mohammad Reza Vahidi, the Iranian soldier, was martyred at 0650 hours of the same day. The UNIIMOG personnel in the region came to the scene and visited the corpse of the martyr and confirmed the incident.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad Javad ZARIF
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

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UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/45/353
S/21404
23 July 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Items 32 and 38 of the provisional agenda*
THE SITUATION IN KAMPUCHEA
QUESTION OF PEACE, STABILITY AND CO-OPERATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 19 July 1990 from the representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Representatives of our Governments met in Paris on 16 and 17 July 1990 for a fifth session of discussions on the modalities of a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict.

We have the honour to enclose the text of the summary of discussions agreed to at that session (see annex) and should be grateful if you would arrange for it to be circulated, with the present letter, as a document of the General Assembly, under items 32 and 38 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) LI Daoyu
Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations

(Signed) Valentin V. LOZINSKIY
Chargé d'affaires ad interim
First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations

(Signed) Thomas R. PICKERING
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations

(Signed) Jean-Marc ROCHEREAU DE LA SABLIERE
Chargé d'affaires ad interim
Deputy Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations

(Signed) Crispin TICKELL
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations

* A/45/150.

ANNEX

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council held their fifth meeting on Cambodia in Paris on 16-17 July 1990.

During this meeting they reviewed developments affecting the Cambodian situation since their last meeting in New York on 25-26 May, including the results of the early June meeting in Tokyo.

The Five made significant progress on two key elements of a solution based on an enhanced UN role: transitional arrangements regarding the administration of Cambodia during the pre-election period; and military arrangements. They agreed to accelerate their work in the remaining three areas (free and fair elections, safeguarding of human rights, and international guarantees) which were identified in their New York meeting as essential aspects of a comprehensive political settlement.

At their request, United Nations Under-Secretary-General Raffeeuddin Ahmed joined the meeting to advise on practical aspects of a UN operation, in the light of recent UN fact-finding missions to Cambodia.

The Five made clear their belief that the time is past due for the Cambodian parties to turn from the battlefield to the negotiating table, in order to play their part in bringing about a comprehensive political settlement. Recalling earlier statements in which the Five agreed to a meeting with them when the time is ripe, the Five called on the Cambodian parties to agree to the establishment at an early date, as an integral part of a comprehensive political settlement, of a Supreme National Council composed of representative individuals with authority among the Cambodian people, to help create the conditions for such a meeting.

The Five agreed to hold their next meeting in New York on 27-28 August 1990.

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21405
24 July 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 23 JULY 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the Iranian armed forces have committed the following violations of the cease-fire provisions:

1. At 0810 hours on 21 June 1990, an Iranian excavator built a 3-metre-high earth mound at the military garrison in the village of Sanjuh, at co-ordinates 443854, 1,700 metres from our I Army Corps units.

2. At 1435 hours on 21 June 1990, the Iranians bombarded Kulakmalan, north-west of Mishaf at co-ordinates 199659, with approximately 10 mortar shells. At 1445 hours on the same day, 30 Iranians were seen conducting a light-weapons attack on that hill, where they remained for some two hours before withdrawing at 1715 hours, 3,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

3. At 0515 hours on 21 June 1990, the Iranians dug five new positions 5 metres in front of those which they had built on 19 June 1990, between the two Iranian posts at co-ordinates 573483 and 574485. At 0730 hours, the Iranians hoisted an Iranian flag over their post at co-ordinates 574485, 400 metres from our II Army Corps units.

4. At 2030 hours on 21 June 1990, 14 Iranians were seen to have been deployed at the Iranian positions constructed on 19 June 1990 between the two posts at co-ordinates 574485 and 573483. Positioned 400 metres from our II Army Corps units, they were equipped with 10 GC rifles and four RPG-7 launchers.

5. At 0630, 0650 and 0810 hours on 21 June 1990, the Iranians dug four communications trenches as follows: one 15 metres long at co-ordinates 274699 and a second 200 metres long and 1 metre deep at co-ordinates 268703, these two trenches being 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units; a third 200 metres long and 0.5 metres deep between co-ordinates 299665 and 299643 and a fourth 900 metres long and 0.5 metres deep between co-ordinates 299638 and 299650, the latter two trenches being 900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

6. At 0640 hours on 21 June 1990, the Iranians built a guard post of concrete blocks inside a 3-metre-wide, 4-metre-long and 1.5-metre-deep hollow at co-ordinates 276695, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

7. At 0650 hours on 21 June 1990, the Iranians built and lined the inside wall of a communications trench with concrete blocks and cement at co-ordinates 278693, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

8. At 0700 hours on 21 June 1990, a hoist was observed lifting five semi-circular sections for concrete shelters from behind the embankment and moving them to co-ordinates 276695, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

9. At 0820 hours on 21 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 200-metre-long communications trench at co-ordinates 295670, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

10. At 1030 hours on 22 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer and a dump truck was observed building a 1-metre-high earth embankment for an old mound in the Keyvard area at co-ordinates 548823, 2,000 metres from our I Army Corps units.

11. At 0730 and 0900 hours on 22 June 1990, the Iranians dug two communications trenches, one 15 metres long at co-ordinates 274699 and the other 30 metres long at co-ordinates 300649, between 400 and 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

12. At 1040 hours on 22 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a bulldozer, two rollers and five dump trucks was observed repairing the earth barrage at co-ordinates 231721, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

13. At 1940 hours on 22 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 50-metre-long and 0.5-metre-deep communications trench on the embankment at co-ordinates 291678, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

14. At 1300 hours on 23 June 1990, eight Iranians set up a 106-millimetre cannon on top of Mount Khadarshariani, at co-ordinates 45633, 2,000 metres from our V Army Corps units.

15. At 0655 hours on 23 June 1990, 10 Iranians lined the inside wall of a 10-metre-long communications trench with concrete blocks and cement at co-ordinates 278693, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

16. At 0650, 0800, 0840, 0940 and 1000 hours on 23 June 1990, the Iranians dug five communications trenches, one 8 metres long at co-ordinates 277695, the second 10 metres long at co-ordinates 274696, the third 800 metres long at co-ordinates 299665, the fourth 25 metres long at co-ordinates 301648 and the fifth 100 metres long at co-ordinates 293677, between 600 and 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

17. At 0930 hours on 23 June 1990, the Iranians fixed a number of pieces of metal to the top of the Iranian tower at co-ordinates 309649, 1,900 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

18. At 0655 hours on 23 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 10-metre-long and 2-metre-deep communications trench on the embankment at co-ordinates 274699, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

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19. At 0900 hours on 23 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 100-metre-long and 0.5-metre-deep communications trench on the embankment at co-ordinates 286686, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

20. At 0900 hours on 23 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 25-metre-long communications trench on the embankment at co-ordinates 303635, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

21. At 1715 hours on 23 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 200-metre-long communications trench at co-ordinates 284687, 500 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

22. At 1730 hours on 24 June 1990, 12 Iranians wearing Kurdish dress were observed constructing a new position and a new guard post on the "rocky point" of hill 2177 at co-ordinates 998119, 2,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

23. At 0635 hours on 24 June 1990, the Iranians set up a four-phase machine-gun at co-ordinates 263032, behind the main road between Eyn Khosh and Dehloran, east of Musian, 4,500 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

24. At 1250 hours on 24 June 1990, 12 Iranians built a new position on Sari Bey at co-ordinates 070538, 1,000 metres from our V Army Corps units.

25. At 1815 hours on 24 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 100-metre-long communications trench at co-ordinates 285686, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

26. At 1115 hours on 25 June 1990, the Iranians resumed construction of a combat position in the flooded area of no man's land at co-ordinates 922933. Two boats and 10 individuals were also observed bringing sandbags from the Iranian barrage to that position, 2,200 metres from our III Army Corps units.

27. Between 11 and 25 June 1990, the Iranians were seen to construct a new 150-metre-long and 2.5-metre-high embankment west of the main road running between Eyn Khosh and Dehloran and north of Ali Na'ir, at co-ordinates 409945, 7,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

28. At 0700 hours on 25 June 1990, the Iranians dug two communications trenches, one 15 metres long at co-ordinates 276695 and the other 10 metres long at co-ordinates 274699, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

29. At 0925 hours on 25 June 1990, five vehicles were observed raising the embankment at co-ordinates 372594, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

30. At 1030 hours on 25 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of five dump trucks, a bulldozer and a water-tanker was observed raising the embankment at co-ordinates 238719, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

31. At 1135 hours on 25 June 1990, the Iranians deepened a 10-metre-long communications trench at co-ordinates 372594, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

32. At 1815 hours on 25 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a grader and a bulldozer was observed repairing the embankment at co-ordinates 251713, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

33. At 1745 hours on 26 June 1990, eight Iranians constructed a large cabin of concrete blocks at the Iranian mound on the left slope of hill 2039, at co-ordinates 737642, 1,700 metres from our I Army Corps units.

34. At 0820 hours on 26 June 1990, the Iranians resumed construction of a combat position in the flooded area of no man's land. Two boats and 15 individuals were observed carrying pieces of concrete block from the Iranian barrage to the position at co-ordinates 922933, 2,200 metres from our III Army Corps units.

35. At 1700 hours on 26 June 1990, an Iranian Poclain excavator was observed completing the 400-metre-long slit trench, bending towards the north at co-ordinates 234064, north and east of Musian. The length of the completed trench, 5,500 metres from our IV Army Corps units, was thus increased to 4,400 metres.

36. At 1730 hours on 26 June 1990, four Iranians were observed using a hoist to erect a water tank, in the form of a tower between 6 and 7 metres high, near the village of Jaliran at co-ordinates 4187, 3,000 metres from our IV Army Corps units.

37. At 0925 hours on 26 June 1990, the Iranians dug two communications trenches, one 200 metres long at co-ordinates 303631 and the other 100 metres long at co-ordinates 278684, both 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

38. At 1000 hours on 26 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and five dump trucks was observed repairing an embankment at co-ordinates 233719, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

39. At 1845 hours on 26 June 1990, three Iranians built a kabrah (small reed hut) on the earth barrage at co-ordinates 299641, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

40. At 1845 hours on 26 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 20-metre-long and 1-metre-deep communications trench on the earth barrage at co-ordinates 303631, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

41. At 1845 hours on 26 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 100-metre-long and 0.5-metre-deep communications trench on the embankment at co-ordinates 299665, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

42. At 0940 hours on 27 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator, a grader and three dump trucks was observed improving the embankment built in no man's land at co-ordinates 944799, 250 metres from our III Army Corps units.

43. At 1845 hours on 27 June 1990, three Iranians built a kabrah (small reed hut) on the earth barrage at co-ordinates 299641, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

44. At 1845 hours on 27 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 20-metre-long and 1-metre-wide communications trench on the earth barrage at co-ordinates 303631, 700 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

45. At 1800 hours on 27 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 100-metre-long and 0.5-metre-wide communications trench on the embankment at co-ordinates 299665, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

46. At 2000 hours on 28 June 1990, an Iranian fired a rifle shot from the Iranian post at co-ordinates 517593 in the direction of our II Army Corps units.

47. At 0650 hours on 28 June 1990, the Iranians built a 10-metre-long and 1.5-metre-deep communications trench, lined with concrete blocks on the inside, at co-ordinates 276695, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

48. At 0915 hours on 28 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of an excavator and three dump trucks was observed moving earth to the forward embankment at co-ordinates 366594, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

49. At 0810 hours on 28 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 10-metre-long and 1.5-metre-deep communications trench on the embankment at co-ordinates 274699, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

50. At 1310 hours on 29 June 1990, five Iranians constructed two guard posts on the earth embankment behind the Sanjuh garrison at co-ordinates 442856, 1,500 metres from our I Army Corps units.

51. At 2030 hours on 30 June 1990, three Iranians dug a firing position at co-ordinates 560798, 900 metres from our II Army Corps units.

52. At 1735 hours on 30 June 1990, nine Iranians built two guard posts of stones and sandbags on the Sakanian peak at co-ordinates 088552, 2,500 metres from our V Army Corps units.

53. At 1600 hours on 30 June 1990, 12 Iranians were seen swimming in the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 576192, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

54. At 0820 hours on 30 June 1990, an Iranian engineering unit consisting of a grader, an excavator, a roller and a water-tanker was observed repairing the embankment at co-ordinates 237719, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

55. At 0910 hours on 30 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 75-metre-long communications trench at co-ordinates 304636, 800 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

56. At 1115 hours on 30 June 1990, the Iranians dug a 2-metre-long and 1-metre-wide communications trench from the embankment to the Shatt al-Arab at co-ordinates 271699, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

57. At 1930 hours on 30 June 1990, the Iranians dug a communications trench at co-ordinates 304622, 600 metres from our VII Army Corps units.

Flooding operation

The Iranian side is continuing its flooding operation in the direction of our III Army Corps units opposite the defensive positions of our military units. The water levels have been as follows:

58. 21 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 20-95 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-90 centimetres.

59. 22 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 20-100 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-90 centimetres.

60. 23 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 5-95 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-90 centimetres.

61. 24 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 5-95 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-90 centimetres.

62. 25 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 6-95 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-90 centimetres.

63. 26 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 4-95 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-90 centimetres.

64. 27 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 6-90 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-90 centimetres.

65. 28 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 10-90 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-90 centimetres.

66. 29 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 9-90 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-90 centimetres.

67. 30 June 1990

Between co-ordinates 678327 and 902203, 8-90 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902203 and 902904, 0-120 centimetres;
Between co-ordinates 902904 and 989731, 0-80 centimetres.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Amir A. AL-ANBARI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/21406
24 July 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period 26 January-24 July 1990)

Introduction

1. By its resolution 648 (1990) of 31 January 1990, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a further interim period of six months, until 31 July 1990. The Council also reiterated its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; re-emphasized the terms of reference and general guidelines of the Force as stated in the report of the Secretary-General of 19 March 1978, approved by resolution 426 (1978), and called upon all parties concerned to co-operate fully with the Force for the full implementation of its mandate; and reiterated that UNIFIL should fully implement its mandate as defined in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and all other relevant resolutions. The Council requested the Secretary-General to continue consultations with the Government of Lebanon and other parties directly concerned on the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Council thereon.

Organization of the Force

2. As of 6 July 1990, the composition of UNIFIL was as follows:

Military personnel

Fiji	HQ UNIFIL	15	
	Infantry battalion	657	
	Force Mobile Reserve	36	
	Military police	8	716

Finland	HQ UNIFIL	12	
	Infantry battalion	505	
	Force Mobile Reserve	16	
	Military police	9	542
France	HQ UNIFIL	15	
	Composite battalion (maintenance company, defence company, armoured escort company)	473	
	Military police	10	498
Ghana	HQ UNIFIL	27	
	Infantry battalion (including engineer company)	821	
	Force Mobile Reserve	36	
	Military police	7	891
Ireland	HQ UNIFIL	33	
	Infantry battalion	652	
	HQ Camp Command	35	
	Force Mobile Reserve	17	
	Military police	12	749
Italy	HQ UNIFIL	5	
	Helicopter unit	42	
	Military police	4	51
Nepal	HQ UNIFIL	12	
	Infantry battalion	808	
	Force Mobile Reserve	26	
	Military police	5	851
Norway	HQ UNIFIL	29	
	Infantry battalion	607	
	Maintenance Company	212	
	Force Mobile Reserve	33	
	Military police	16	897
Sweden	HQ UNIFIL	22	
	Logistic battalion	617	
	Military police	8	647
	Total UNIFIL		5 842 a/

a/ The total UNIFIL strength includes three officers (one Fijian, one Ghanaian and one Nepalese) who have temporarily been assigned to serve as military advisers to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The deployment of UNIFIL as of July 1990 is shown on the map attached to the present report.

3. The command of UNIFIL continues to be exercised by Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren of Sweden.

4. In the period under review, 65 military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) assisted UNIFIL in the performance of its tasks. These unarmed officers are organized as Observer Group Lebanon and are under the operational control of the Force Commander of UNIFIL. They man the five observation posts along the Lebanese side of the Israel-Lebanon armistice demarcation line. They also operate four mobile teams in that part of the area controlled by Israel which is within the UNIFIL area of operation. Two military observers are assigned to UNIFIL headquarters.

5. Logistic support for UNIFIL is provided by the Swedish Logistic battalion, elements of the French composite battalion, the Norwegian maintenance company and the Italian helicopter unit and by some sections of the civilian staff, especially in the areas of communications and vehicle maintenance. UNIFIL employs some 600 civilian staff.

6. The Force Mobile Reserve, a composite mechanized company, currently consisting of elements from six contingents (Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal and Norway) and organized as an integrated unit, has frequently been called upon to reinforce UNIFIL battalions.

7. The strength of the Lebanese army unit assigned to the UNIFIL area of operation currently stands at 128, all ranks. The bulk of the unit is stationed at Tyre, while small elements are at Arzun, Al Yatun and Qana. In addition, some 500 Lebanese Army recruits are undergoing training at Tyre.

8. I regret to report that during the current mandate period two Nepalese members of the Force lost their lives as a result of mortar fire. Ten others suffered injuries as a result of hostile fire and accidents. Since the establishment of UNIFIL, 173 military and civilian members of the Force have died, 67 as a result of firing or mine or bomb explosions, 75 in accidents and 31 from other causes. Two hundred and forty-three have been wounded by firing or mine or bomb explosions.

9. UNIFIL has continued to improve the security of its personnel and positions. Work continued on a new compound near Ebel es Saqi for the headquarters of the Norwegian battalion. The security and defence of the Naqoura Camp and of the headquarters of the Irish battalion have been improved and strengthened. Further protective works have been undertaken at positions throughout the UNIFIL area of deployment. The 10 armoured personnel carriers made available by Finland for use by the Irish battalion are now fully operational. Two more are being made available by Finland for use by the Ghanaian battalion. With the agreement of the donor, this arrangement is again being financed by a voluntary contribution from the Government of Japan.

10. UNIFIL has continued to have difficulties in obtaining and using the land and buildings it requires for its operations. These difficulties emanated from the increased demand for land and dwellings resulting from the influx of population into the area, from arrears in the payment of rent by the Government of Lebanon to the landlords concerned and from the sharp depreciation of the real value of such rent payments as were made. This problem has been raised with the Lebanese authorities on numerous occasions.

Situation in the UNIFIL area of operation

11. Israel continues to control in southern Lebanon an area manned by the Israel Defence Force (IDF) and the de facto forces (DFF), the so-called "South Lebanon Army". The boundaries of the Israeli-controlled area have not been clearly defined but are determined de facto by the forward positions of IDF and DFF. It includes territory adjacent to the armistice demarcation line, parts of the Fijian, Nepalese, Irish and Finnish battalion sectors and the entire Norwegian battalion sector, as well as sizeable areas to the north of the UNIFIL area of operation. Within the area of operation, IDF and DFF occupied 66 military positions. The parts of the Israeli-controlled area that fall within the UNIFIL area of operation, together with the IDF and DFF positions are shown on the attached map. (The map does not show areas under Israeli control north of the UNIFIL area of operation.)

12. The Norwegian battalion sector is a special case as it has been entirely within the Israeli-controlled area since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. UNIFIL has nevertheless continued to do everything possible to ensure the peaceful character of this area, in accordance with its mandate. It was pointed out to the Israeli authorities that that policy required that IDF/DFF should not undertake military operations in the sector. For a number of years UNIFIL's position in this regard was respected and the inhabitants of the sector were able to lead comparatively peaceful lives. During the last two years, however, there has been a growing tendency for IDF/DFF to undertake military operations in the sector. These incidents have been protested to the Israeli authorities and a number of confrontations have occurred when UNIFIL has used vehicles and other obstacles to try to block the IDF/DFF activities. During the reporting period, there has been a reduction in DFF incursions into the sector. Regrettably, however, there has been a marked increase in incidents involving IDF, especially at the eastern and western extremities of the sector, and these now occur several times a week on average, in spite of UNIFIL's protests.

13. During the period under review, UNIFIL recorded 42 operations by resistance groups against IDF and DFF targets (17 in February, 4 in March, 14 in April, 2 in May, 3 in June and 2 in July). These operations usually took the form of attacks with small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, rockets and mortars. Mines and roadside bombs were also often used against IDF/DFF vehicles and foot patrols.

14. UNIFIL has continued to oppose attempts by armed elements to operate within its area of deployment. This has occasionally led to friction. At times, UNIFIL's insistence on searching vehicles and denying passage to armed elements through UNIFIL checkpoints has led to harassment and threats against UNIFIL personnel,

attempts at forced entry or firings close to UNIFIL checkpoints, but such incidents were normally resolved after negotiation. However, on 21 January 1990, following an exchange of fire between a DFF position near Haddathah and armed elements in the village, a UNIFIL patrol went there to assess the situation. In Haddathah, armed elements fired at the patrol and, in the ensuing exchange, two of them, members of the Amal movement, were killed, while three Irish UNIFIL soldiers were wounded, one of them seriously.

15. Firing from IDF/DFF positions or by IDF/DFF patrols, whether unprovoked or in retaliation for attacks by armed elements, occurred daily and sometimes involved the use of heavy artillery, tanks and Israeli helicopter gunships. Frequently IDF/DFF in their positions or on patrol fired close to, and on occasion at, UNIFIL positions. During the reporting period there were 109 unprovoked firings close to UNIFIL positions. A particularly serious incident occurred on 20 January 1990, when UNIFIL position 5-23 came under heavy mortar fire from a DFF position to the south. Two Nepalese UNIFIL soldiers were killed and six were wounded. This incident was vigorously protested to the Israeli authorities. Indiscriminate fire has also been directed at villages from IDF/DFF positions when the latter have come under attack from armed elements. The most serious case was on 2 April 1990 when, after such an incident, Brashit was hit by heavy tank, mortar and machine-gun fire. UNIFIL has also protested to IDF whenever such incidents have occurred.

16. UNIFIL troops detonated mines, roadside bombs, unexploded remnants of war and dismantled rockets in the area of deployment. A total of 37 controlled explosions were carried out in the last six months, compared to 10 during the previous period.

17. UNIFIL extended humanitarian assistance to the civilian population in its area, to the extent possible within available resources. Such assistance took the form of water, food, fuel, electricity and escort for farmers. In addition, medicines and equipment or services to schools were provided from resources made available by the troop-contributing Governments. UNIFIL medical centres provided care to an average of 4,000 civilian patients per month and, at the UNIFIL hospital at Naqoura, some 1,100 civilian patients were treated per month, about 60 of them as in-patients. The Force co-operated closely on humanitarian matters with the Lebanese authorities, the United Nations agencies and programmes operating in Lebanon, the International Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations.

18. In my report of 25 January 1990 (S/21102, para. 24), I again referred to the Lebanese authorities' complaint that a military road constructed by IDF on Lebanese territory adjacent to the frontier with the Syrian Arab Republic south of the Norwegian battalion sector had interrupted Lebanese civilians' access to their land in the area. UNIFIL has continued to pursue this matter with the Israeli authorities. On 19 July 1990, a UNIFIL team visited the area and confirmed that, when the new road is fenced, some 20 families belonging to the village of Chebaa in the Norwegian battalion sector will be cut off from land astride the frontier between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic which they have traditionally used for grazing and tillage. It is to be noted that they already lost an important part of their land when Israel constructed a fenced road inside the Syrian Arab Republic after the 1967 war. UNIFIL has urged IDF to minimize the hardship caused to these

Chebaa people by enabling them to pass to and fro through the proposed fence as necessary.

19. During the reporting period, Israel carried out an extensive programme of road construction in the Israeli-controlled area. A number of paved roads, with tank tracks alongside, have been built from gates in the fence along the armistice demarcation line to military positions built by Israel in the area. This construction has enhanced IDF's ability to deploy rapidly into Lebanese territory.

20. My report of 25 January 1990 (S/21102, paras. 25-30) described the measures taken by Israel to establish some aspects of a civilian administration in the Israeli-controlled area. The situation remains as described in that report, the only new development of significance being the re-establishment of a gendarmerie in some major towns in the Israeli-controlled area. The gendarmerie is under the control of DFF and service in it is restricted to persons from southern Lebanon.

21. During UNIFIL's current mandate there have been renewed accusations that the Israeli authorities are diverting into Israel water from Lebanese rivers, especially the Litani. In his letter of 6 April 1990 (A/45/206-S/21237), the Permanent Representative of Lebanon drew my attention to this subject. UNIFIL had already been instructed to watch out for any indication that there was substance to such reports, which had been consistently denied by Israel. The Force Commander, after carrying out a survey, has reported to me that UNIFIL has not detected any evidence that water is being pumped or transported from Lebanon into Israel. The Israeli authorities have again categorically denied that they are taking, or intend to take, water from Lebanon into Israel. UNIFIL will continue to monitor this question closely and to investigate any reports that are sufficiently precise to permit investigation.

Financial aspects

22. By its resolution 44/188 of 21 December 1989, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for UNIFIL at a rate not to exceed $12,001,000 gross ($11,806,000 net) per month for the 12-month period beginning 1 February 1990, should the Security Council decide to continue the Force beyond the period of six months authorized under its resolution 639 (1989). By its resolution 648 (1990) of 31 January 1990, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNIFIL to 31 July 1990. Should the Council decide to extend UNIFIL beyond its current mandate period, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining the Force during a six-month extension period would be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 44/188, assuming continuance of the Force's existing strength and responsibilities.

23. At the beginning of July 1990, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIFIL Special Account for the mandate periods ending 31 July 1990 amounted to $307.4 million, which is equivalent to the budget of the Force for more than two years at the current rate of expenditure.

Observations

24. The Lebanese authorities continue to attach the greatest importance to UNIFIL's presence in southern Lebanon and to the implementation in full of resolution 425 (1978). They believe that the putting into effect of the Taif Agreement will make it possible for the central Government to re-establish its authority in southern Lebanon. This process will also, of course, have to include the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces and the deployment of UNIFIL along the armistice demarcation line. UNIFIL stands ready to play its part in this process, in accordance with its mandate, as soon as the Lebanese Government is in a position to deploy the Lebanese army to the UNIFIL area and to re-establish the necessary civilian administrative structures there. Meanwhile, in his letter of 16 July 1990 (S/21396) the Permanent Representative of Lebanon conveyed his Government's request that the mandate of UNIFIL be extended for a further period of six months.

25. Israel's attitude to the situation in southern Lebanon and to UNIFIL's mandate remains as described in previous reports. The Israeli authorities continue to take the position that the Israeli presence in Lebanon is a temporary arrangement, which is necessary for ensuring the security of northern Israel so long as the Lebanese Government is not able to exercise effective authority and prevent its territory from being used to launch attacks against Israel. They do not consider that UNIFIL, as a peace-keeping force, can assume this responsibility. They continue to build up DFF and to improve their ability to reinforce quickly IDF's strength inside Lebanon. A consequence of this policy is that the Israeli-controlled area is becoming increasingly separated from the rest of Lebanon. Hostile incidents in the UNIFIL area were fewer during the current mandate period than in the corresponding period in 1989, but IDF and DFF carried out many air and artillery attacks on targets to the north of the UNIFIL area.

26. For its part, UNIFIL continues, to the best of its ability and in accordance with its mandate, to prevent its area from being used for hostile activities of any kind. Its efforts in this regard have received the co-operation of the Amal movement and a high degree of calm and tranquillity has been achieved in those parts of its area that lie outside the Israeli-controlled area. Recent months have seen a noteworthy increase in economic activity in those parts, with the construction of many new houses, the construction and repair of roads and water-distribution systems and the building of new terraces for agriculture. In order to foster the confidence that is a necessary condition for such investment, UNIFIL has established some new positions close to the edge of the Israeli-controlled area. It has also continued to press the Israeli authorities to end the shelling of civilian targets by DFF and to withdraw DFF from certain positions that are most frequently responsible for such firing and that attract attacks by armed elements. As reported above (para. 12), the Norwegian battalion, being deployed wholly within the Israeli-controlled area, is in a particularly difficult situation. Its ability to prevent hostilities and promote normal civilian activities depends on the co-operation of IDF. It is important that this should be forthcoming.

27. In carrying out their duties in an area where, in spite of all its efforts, armed groups abound and hostilities occur, UNIFIL's personnel are exposed to many

dangers. The Force again suffered fatalities during the current mandate period and it has still proved impossible to establish with certainty the fate of Lt. Col. William R. Higgins, who was kidnapped near Tyre on 17 February 1988. I continue to attach the highest priority to the security of UNIFIL personnel and progress has again been made in improving the physical security of the Force's positions. But security for the Force can be achieved only if all the parties in this complicated situation co-operate with it, respect its international and neutral status and avoid exposing its members to danger. I reiterate my appeal to all the parties to act accordingly.

28. I believe that the Security Council will again judge that, although it has not yet been possible for UNIFIL to carry out in full the mandate given to it in 1978, the Force continues to make an important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security in a volatile area. I accordingly recommend that the Council accept the Lebanese Government's request and extend UNIFIL's mandate for a further period of six months, that is until 31 January 1991.

29. In making this recommendation, I must, however, draw the Security Council's attention to the continuing gravity of the Force's financial situation. Although there has been a slight reduction in total unpaid assessments, they are still at the very high level of $307 million. This represents money owed by the United Nations to the Member States that have voluntarily contributed troops to serve in UNIFIL, often in conditions of danger and discomfort. It is difficult to understand why such a problem should afflict a United Nations peace-keeping operation that has such an important mission and whose mandate has repeatedly been renewed by unanimous vote of the Security Council. My concern is heightened by the fact that, after 12 years in the field, UNIFIL faces a growing need to replace equipment that has become obsolete or unserviceable. It is thus all the more important that Member States should pay their assessments promptly and in full and that all existing arrears should be cleared.

30. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to Lieutenant-General Lars-Eric Wahlgren, the Force Commander and to all the men and women under his command and control, both military and civilian, for the courage and determination with which they have again faced a difficult mandate period. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.


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南黎巴嫩部 • SOUTHERN LEBANON
LIBAN MÉRIDIONAL
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MEDITERRANEAN SEA
LEBANON
ISRAEL
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Ar Rashīdīyah
Ra's al 'Ayn
Burj ash Shamālī
Shabrihā
Abbāsīyah
Ansār
Az Zrārīyah
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Srifā
Frun
Shīhīn
Ma'rakah
Al Bazūrīyah
Ayn B'al
Hannawīyah
Qānā
Mazra'at al Mushrif
As Sultānīyah
Safad
At Yātūn
Bir as Sanasil
Khirbat Silm
Majdal Zūn
Buyūt as Sayyid
Al Buwayḍah
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Shamā
Jabal Bayāḍ
Tayr Ḥarfā
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Yārīn
Ayta ash Shab
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

وزع قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان اعتبارا من تموز/يوليه ١٩٩٠

一九九〇年七月联黎部队部署情况

UNIFIL DEPLOYMENT AS OF JULY 1990

DÉPLOIEMENT DE LA FINUL AU MOIS DE JUILLET 1990

ДИСЛОКАЦИЯ ВСООНЛ НА ИЮЛЬ 1990

DESPLIEGUE DE LA FPNUL EN JULIO DE 1990

مركز مراقبة	نقطة تفتيش	قاعدة	موقع مؤقت
观察所	哈查站	基地	临时阵地
Observation post	Check point	Base	Temporary position
Poste d'observation	Point de contrôle	Base	Position temporaire
Наблюдательный пункт	Контрольный пункт	База	Временная позиция
Puesto de observación	Puesto de control	Base	Posición provisional

حدود مناطق عمليات قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区界限西边和北边
UNIFIL Operational boundaries, West and North
Limite de la zone d'opérations de la Force à l'ouest et au nord
Оперативные рубежи ВСООНЛ, Запад и Север
Límites de las zonas de operaciones de la Fuerza, Oeste y Norte

العدود الفاصلة بين كتائب قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队各营之间界限
UNIFIL Inter Battalion boundaries
Limites des secteurs des différents bataillons de la Force
Разделительные линии между районами расположения батальонов ВСООНЛ
Límites entre batallones de la Fuerza

● وحدة لبنانية
黎巴嫩单位
Lebanese Unit
Unité libanaise
Ливанские подразделения
Unidad libanesa

موقع لقوات الدفاع الاسرائيلية و/او "جيش جنوب لبنان"
以色列国防军和（或）"南黎巴嫩军"阵地
Israeli Defence Forces and/or "South Lebanon Army" Position
Position des Forces de défense israéliennes et/ou de "l'armée du Liban du Sud"
Позиция израильских сил обороны и/или "южноливанской армии"
Posición de la Fuerza de Defensa de Israel y/o del "Ejército del Líbano meridional"

الحدود التقريبية لما يقع تحت السيطرة الاسرائيلية من منطقة عمل قوة الامم المتحدة المؤقتة في لبنان
联黎部队行动地区内在以色列控制下地区概况
Approximate area under Israel control in UNIFIL area of operation
Périmètre approximatif de la zone sous contrôle israélien dans la zone d'opérations de la FINUL
Примерный район в зоне действия ВСООНЛ, находящийся под контролем Израиля
Area aproximada bajo control israelí dentro de la zona de operaciones de la Fuerza

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/21406/Corr.1
27 July 1990

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

(for the period 26 January 1990-24 July 1990)

Corrigendum

Paragraph 14, line 6

For 21 January 1990 read 21 February 1990

Paragraph 15, line 6

For 20 January 1990 read 19 February 1990

90-17570 2170a (E)

UNITED
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S/21406/Add.1
26 July 1990

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON

Addendum

1. In paragraph 12 of my report of 24 July 1990 on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) (S/21406), I referred to the difficulties encountered by UNIFIL in the Norwegian battalion sector, which lies wholly within the Israeli controlled area, and to confrontations which have occurred from time to time when UNIFIL has used vehicles and other obstacles to try to block activities of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the de facto forces (DFF) in that sector. The Security Council may wish to be aware of a particularly serious confrontation of this kind which has taken place in recent days.

2. For some years, the IDF has occupied a position in the vicinity of the village of Kaoukaba which lies in the north-western corner of the Norwegian battalion sector of the UNIFIL area of operation. The position itself is close to, but just outside, the northern boundary of the Norwegian battalion's area of operations and thus outside UNIFIL's area.

3. In April 1990, a UNIFIL position nearby observed that the IDF was undertaking engineering works to construct a road leading westward from its position. Initially these works were outside the Norwegian battalion's area of operation. On 12 July, however, an IDF foot patrol entered the Norwegian battalion sector and was followed by two bulldozers and a tank. UNIFIL personnel attempted to block the IDF work by standing in the path of the bulldozers. When this tactic did not achieve the desired effect, UNIFIL armoured personnel carriers were deployed but these too were pushed aside by the bulldozers. Following contact by UNIFIL with IDF liaison staff, a senior Israeli officer arrived on the scene. Negotiations took place with the officer commanding the Norwegian battalion but the IDF officer refused to stop the construction work. After the IDF personnel and equipment had withdrawn for the night, the IDF informed UNIFIL that they would use force if UNIFIL continued to try to prevent construction of the road.

4. On 13 July the Acting Force Commander of UNIFIL met with IDF liaison staff, protested the previous day's incident and pressed the IDF to respect the Norwegian battalion's area of operation. During the following days the IDF continued their

engineering works. On 21 and 22 July, the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, who was visiting the area, and the Force Commander of UNIFIL raised the matter with military and civilian authorities in Israel. On 22 July, at a meeting with the Israeli Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Netanyahu, it was agreed that a meeting should be held between the Force Commander and the Israeli officer commanding the Northern Command in order to resolve the problem.

5. This meeting was arranged for 31 July. However, on 23 July, the day following the meeting with the Israeli Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, there was a repetition of the events of 12 July. An IDF bulldozer, accompanied by a foot patrol, entered the Norwegian battalion sector. It hit a UNIFIL armoured personnel carrier, which had been placed in its path, and destroyed one of its tracks. It then pushed aside two further armoured personnel carriers, causing damage to them and putting them out of action. An officer of the Norwegian battalion of UNIFIL who had stood in the path of the bulldozer was injured. A UNIFIL bulldozer was next placed in front of the IDF bulldozer. At this point, an IDF main battle tank appeared on the scene and moved very close to the UNIFIL bulldozer. The senior IDF officer on the spot, who had earlier loaded his weapon, stated that he would order the IDF tank to fire at the United Nations bulldozer if it did not leave the area within two minutes. In face of this threat of force, the officer commanding the Norwegian battalion ordered the UNIFIL bulldozer to withdraw.

6. On 25 July, two IDF bulldozers, accompanied by Israeli troops, again entered the Norwegian battalion sector and, having bypassed UNIFIL armoured personnel carriers stationed in a blocking position, extended the new road as far as a metalled road within the Norwegian battalion sector. Repeated attempts by UNIFIL officers to negotiate a stop to this further violation failed because the IDF officer in charge refused to speak with them.

7. UNIFIL has throughout made vigorous protests at these repeated violations of its area. The IDF has stated, however, that the road will be built irrespective of UNIFIL's protests and of the discussions which the Under-Secretary-General and the Force Commander had had with the Israeli authorities.

8. These incidents highlight the anomaly of the situation in which the Force finds itself in those parts of its area of operation that are effectively under Israeli military occupation. Inevitably, these incidents also raise questions about the viability of the policy described in paragraph 12 of my report of 24 July. Like other peace-keeping operations, UNIFIL cannot function if one of the parties refuses to co-operate with it and threatens the use of force. Since the incidents described above, I have again urged the Government of Israel that its troops should respect the Norwegian battalion's area of operation. It remains my view that the prospects of keeping the area peaceful would be greatly improved if Israeli forces did not operate in it. If, however, they insist on doing so, it may become necessary for the Council to consider whether UNIFIL's role in that area should be changed.

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LETTER DATED 23 JULY 1990 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the note verbale from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C., addressed to the Embassy of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria concerning violations of principles of international law by the United States Naval Forces stationed in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman.

It would be appreciated if this letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad Javad ZARIF
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative

Annex

Note verbale dated 18 June 1990 from the Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C. addressed to the Embassy of Algeria in Washington, D.C.

The Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Washington, D.C., presents its compliments to the Embassy of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria and has the honour to quote the attached messages in two copies, the original text and an unofficial translation, received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is respectfully requested that the original text of these messages be transmitted to the United States Department of State and that our office be informed of their response.

Enclosure

According to information received from officials of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, United States warships positioned in the Sea of Oman and the Persian Gulf have created a nuisance for Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft and United States aircraft have intercepted routine sea-patrolling missions of Iranian aircraft on the dates and at the locations that follow:

A. Warnings by United States warships

1. On 9 January 1990 at 1158 hours, United States warship No. 52, at the position of N2621 and E5605, warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2627 and E5605, to change its course towards 250 degrees.

2. On 11 January 1990 at 1044 hours, United States warship No. 53, at the position of N2358 and E5828, warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2414 and E5828, not to get closer to the warship.

3. On 11 February 1990 at 0910 hours, United States warship No. 42, at the position of N2612 and E5340, warned the pilot of an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft, whose position was N2600 and E5256, not to get closer to the warship.

B. Interception by United States aircraft

1. On 24 January 1990 at 1153 hours, a United States F-14 aircraft, numbered 107, intercepted an Iranian sea-patrolling aircraft whose position was N2451 and E5800, for a period of 10 minutes.

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran protests such illegal actions by the Government of the United States.